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The subjects in this experiment were 200
undergraduate women enrolled in a begin-
ning psychology course at The University
of Michigan. The subjects were paired
using criteria aimed at minimizing the prob-
ability that the subjects were previously
acquainted. We tried not to pair subjects
who lived in the same residence hall. It
was impossible to follow this criterion com-
pletely, but in no pair did the subjects live
on the same floor, and in only one pair did
the subjects appear to have been previously
acquainted. This latter pair was dropped
from the analysis. One subject in each of
two other pairs was familiar with the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game, and these two pairs
were also dropped. Furthermore, the last
pair was not used in the analysis in order
to limit the total to 96 pairs. The reason
will be mentioned presently.
The game matrix, used in a previous study
(Morehous, 1964), was as follows:
Every pair of subjects played a one-trial
game, a two-trial game, a five-trial game,
and a ten-trial game. In order to compen-
sate for any effect due to the position in
which the game was played, the order of
the games was varied systematically. Posi-
tion, as used here, means that a game with
a given number of trials was played first,
second, third, or fourth in the sequence.
The four different games can thus be or-
dered in 24 ways, with each game being
played in each position six times. To
equalize the effects that position might have,
the number of subject pairs had to equal
some multiple of 24. Thus the number of
pairs was limited to 96, and each game was
played in each position 24 times-enough
for reliable analysis.
The payoff to a subject was the algebraic
sum of the points she had earned in k
trials ( k equalling the length of a run),
divided by k. Therefore each game was
worth a maximum of ten points and a
1 My special thanks go to Dr. Anatol Rapo-
port for his advice concerning the development
of this study and to Phillip Dale for his work
in programming the computer operations.
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minimum of minus ten points. The points
were then converted into cents on a one-
to-one ratio. This procedure served to make
each game worth the same amount of
money, regardless of the number of trials.
A payoff was made at the end of each game.
If the subject had a positive score she got
money from the experimenter; if she had a
negative score she paid the experimenter.
If, after completing these four different
games, either subject had actually lost
money to the experimenter, the following
game matrix was introduced:
C D
C 15,15 0,25
D 25, 0 10,10
The new game was played as before ex-
cept that a payoff occurred after each trial
rather than after each game. The pair con-
tinued to play this game until both subjects
had at least as much money as they had
had before the experiment began. (Since
the subjects were unpaid and required to
participate for course credit, it was felt
that they should not lose their own money
in the experiment.)
A written feedback explaining the ex-
periment was mailed to each subject after
the data from all the subjects had been
collected.
Results
If, in a given trial, a subject chose either
the top row or the left column of the matrix,
her response is indicated by C (coopera-
tion). If she chose either the bottom row
or the right column, her response is indi-
cated by D (defection). Thus the outcome
of any trial can be represented by CC, CD,
DC, or DD. CC and DD may be thought
of as bilateral cooperation and bilateral de-
fection, respectively. CD and DC are essen-
tially the same outcome in reverse, uni-
lateral cooperation or unilateral defection.
Unilateral cooperation or unilateral defec-
tion will be represented here by UNI
(= 1/2 [CD-f-DC] ) . Total cooperation, the
single letter C, is equal to CC + %(CD+
DC).
The first question raised by the collected
data is whether the position in which a
particular length of run was played had any
effect on the level of cooperation. To test
the null hypothesis, a median test for sig-
nificance was run for each of the four pa-
rameters in each of the games. Table 1
presents the chi-squares. All except one are
above the .05 level of significance (df = 3).
The subjects apparently considered a par-
ticular game in the same manner whether
it was played first or whether it was played
in the light of previous experience. We shall
conclude that there was not enough evi-
dence to reject the null hypothesis; the ex-
ception will be included in the analysis.
Since we can disregard the position in
which a game was played, the means of the
four parameters C, CC, DD, and UNI take
on greatest interest. In Table 2 we see that,
in one- and two-trial games, UNI and CC
were about equal; together they formed
about one-third of the subjects’ responses.
Two-thirds of all responses were non-
cooperative.
The level of total cooperation (C) in
the five- and ten-trial games is slightly
above the level of bilateral defection (DD).
Again unilateral cooperation and bilateral
cooperation are approximately equal, but
their values have risen from the shorter
games.
The parametric means for five- and ten-
trial games are also similar to each other
and different from those of the shorter
games. The chi-squares in Table 2 make
use of this difference, for they were cal-
culated by a median test for significance
(df = 1) using only two categories: one-
and two-trial games, and five- and ten-trial
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TABLE 1
CHI-SQUARES FOR MEDIAN TEST FOR SIGNIFI-
CANCE BETWEEN POSITION AND THE PARAM-
ETERS C, CC, DD, AND UNI
* p < .02.
games. One- and two-trial games demon-
strate about the same level of cooperation.
Between two-trial games and five-trial
games cooperation increases.
On comparing the long run of 300 trials
with the short-run games we see that bi-
lateral cooperation is about equal in five-
trial, ten-trial, and 300-trial games, and that
unilateral cooperation in 300-trial games
equals that in one- and two-trial games. In
the 300-trial games there is a slightly greater
degree of bilateral choices than in the
shorter games. We might expect this to be
the case, since the first few trials of a game
are probably devoted to testing different
strategies, and later on the choices become
more stable. That is, the &dquo;lock-in&dquo; sets in
later in the game.
Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 show the time
courses for two-trial, five-trial, and ten-trial
games and for the first ten trials of 300-
trial games on each of four parameters. The
time courses show little difference between
the five-trial game and the first five trials
of the ten-trial game. Because of this simi-
larity we shall describe only the time courses
of the ten-trial game. As the trials proceed,
overall cooperation begins high and then
takes a dip, but rises again on the seventh
trial. But for a lower frequency of re-
sponses, the curve for bilateral cooperation
is much the same as that for total coopera-
tion. Thus the frequency of unilateral co-
operation remains fairly constant. Bilateral
TABLE 2
MEAN C, CC, DD, AND UNI FOR 1-TRIAL, 2-
TRIAL, 5-TRIAL, 10-TRIAL, AND 300-TRIAL
GAMES
defection tends to rise and then level off.
Comparing the first ten trials of the 300-
trial game with the ten-trial game, we see
that both curves for total cooperation have
the same tendency. The main exception to
this is the fact that the curve for the 300-
trial game begins much lower.2
Summarizing these results, we can say
that five-trial games seem to be played in
much the same manner as the first five
trials of ten-trial games, and in some re-
spects the ten-trial game is similar to the
first ten trials of the 300-trial game.
The data just presented have described
the overall levels of cooperation and defec-
tion and the time courses generated by the
parameters, but the dynamics of this con-
flict situation can be analyzed even further.
To do this, we use four other parameters,
x, y, z, and w (Rapoport, 1965a). To x
we assign the probability of a player’s co-
operating after an outcome in which both
players cooperated; to y, the probability that
a player will cooperate after an outcome
in which he cooperated and the other player
defected; to z, the probability that a player
will cooperate after an outcome in which
he defected and the other player cooper-
ated ; and to w, the probability that a player
will cooperate after an outcome in which
both players defected.
2 See the article by Rapoport and Dale in this
issue.
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Fic. 1. Time courses for C responses in two-trial, five-trial, ten-trial, and 300-trial games.
These parameters are particularly inter-
esting in light of what they represent. Since
x demonstrates the willingness to continue
bilateral cooperation, it may be thought of
as a measure of &dquo;trustworthiness.&dquo; &dquo;Forgive-
ness&dquo; or &dquo;teaching by example&dquo; may be
suggested by y. The next parameter, z,
suggests &dquo;responsiveness&dquo; to the other
player’s action. Finally, w indicates a
player’s attempt to break the bilateral de-
fection and his hope of moving to a situation
like z, &dquo;trust.&dquo;
Table 3 presents these parameters for
two-trial, five-trial, ten-trial, and 300-trial
games. The meanings of the parameters
may be more fully understood if we go
through the two-trial game step by step. If,
on the first trial, a player cooperates and his
partner does too (CC), the player is likely
to cooperate on the next trial (x = .77).
If, however, he cooperates and his partner
defects on the first trial (CD), he is likely
to defect on the second trial ( 1- y = .68).
In other words, if a player cooperates on
the first trial, on the second trial he is likely
to do what his partner did on the first trial
( p = .73). The correlation (phi coefficient)
between the partner’s response on the first
trial and the player’s response on the second
trial is .81. In the case where a player de-
fects on the first trial, he is likely to defect
on the second trial too (1 - z = .84, 1 - w
=.83), regardless of his partner’s response
on the first trial. The correlation between
the partner’s response on the first trial and
the player’s response on the second trial is
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FIG. 2. Time courses for CC responses in two-, five-, ten-, and 300-trial games.
-.024. Once a player defects on the first
trial, the probability that he will defect on
the second trial appears to be a relatively
stable characteristic. Only if a player co-
operates on the first trial does his partner’s
behavior influence his response on the sec-
ond trial.
This last statement holds true for five-,
ten-, and 300-trial games, but the intensity
changes. In the two shorter-run games,
when a player cooperates on one trial there
is not quite so strong a relationship between
the partner’s response on that trial and the
player’s response on the next trial. There
is also a much greater propensity, in the
longer games, to cooperate on a trial when
the player has defected on the previous
trial. This greater degree of &dquo;responsive-
ness&dquo; and &dquo;trust&dquo; is probably the main
reason why five- and ten-trial games have
a higher level of cooperation than the two-
trial game. If a player defects on the first
trial of a two-trial game, the fact that the
second trial is the last one apparently leads
to a defensive strategy. His reasoning may
go like this: &dquo;Since I defected on the first
trial, my partner will not trust me to co-
operate on the second trial, and he will de-
TABLE 3
MEAN X, t~, Z, AND 2U FOR 2-TRIAL, 5-TRIAL,
10-TRIAL, AND 300-TRIAL GAMES
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FiG. 3. Time courses for DD responses in two-, five-, ten-, and 300-trial games.
fect; if he defects and I cooperate, I will
lose 10 points, but if I defect again I will
lose only five points.&dquo;
In slightly longer runs (five or ten trials)
this reasoning is not as compelling, for
there are more occasions for a player to
show his intention to cooperate and to make
up for a monetary loss on one trial. Whether
or not one additional trial (a three-trial
game) would eliminate this effect is a prob-
lem for further investigation.
To continue our analysis of two-trial
games, consider for a moment the first two
trials of a k-trial game. If a CC or DD
outcome occurs on the first trial, then we
would expect the players to follow suit on
the second trial. This is supported by the
high values of x and 1~. From the values
of 1-y and 1-z we would expect that first-
trial outcomes of CD or DC would lead
to more DDs than CCs on the second trial,
and so we would expect cooperation to de-
crease on the second trial. Two-trial and
five-trial games support this expectation
(Table 1), but the opposite occurs in ten-
trial and 300-trial games. Although the
foundation is admittedly weak, we suggest
that the phenomenon of less cooperation on
the second trial than on the first trial is
more often true of very short-run games
than it is of longer runs.
Still considering two successive trials, let
us turn our attention to the last two trials
in a game. For one-trial games the defec-
tion response is the &dquo;reasonable&dquo; solution
to the Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix if the
360
Fic. 4. Time courses for UNI responses in two-, five-, ten-, and 300-trial games.
player has no idea what his partner will do
(Luce, 1957). By the same reasoning we
may expect cooperation to drop on the last
trial of a game-a player may try to get
the T payoff (T for &dquo;temptation,&dquo; the re-
ward for being the lone defector), since
his partner will not be able to retaliate.
The five-trial game supports this hypothesis,
for total cooperation drops from .46 to .41
and bilateral defection rises from .30 to .40
between the fourth trial and the fifth (last).
Between the last two trials in the 300-trial
game, total cooperation drops from .16 to
.13 and bilateral defection rises from .29
to .33-an effect which is not so strong
but in the same direction. The ten-trial
game, however, is an exception to this hy-
pothesis, for cooperation between the last
two trials rises slightly. In sum, the results
tend to confirm the direction of our ex-
pectation but they are still far from con-
clusive.
In a two-trial game each player bases his
first choice only on a priori reasoning. His
second and last choice, however, is based on
the nature of the outcome of the first trial.
We have already considered the probability
of a player’s cooperating after particular
outcomes on the first trial. But let us look
at the second trial more closely by examin-
ing the frequency with which the unique
successive outcomes are played. Given the
four different outcomes that can occur on
each of the two trials, there are 16 succes-
sive outcomes, but not all of them are
unique. CC/CD is the same as CC/DC,
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TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF UNIQUE OUTCOMES ON THE
FIRST Two TRIALS n.1 GAMES WITH
RUNS OF DIFFERENT LENGTHS
and DD/CD is the same as DD/DC; like-
wise, all successive outcomes starting with
CD are identical to those starting with DC.
All together, there are ten unique succes-
sive outcomes.
Table 4 presents the unique successive
outcomes in rank-order of their frequency
of occurrence in two-trial games. By far
the most frequent (56 percent of the sub-
jects) is a bilateral defection after either
unilateral or bilateral defection. This pro-
pensity to defect in the wake of defection
is much stronger than the propensity to co-
operate in the wake of cooperation.
The rank-order of preference remains
approximately the same for five-, ten-, and
300-trial games. The mean rank intercor-
relation among the four games is .78. Most
of the variance among the games lies in
the three least frequent unique successive
outcomes. Subjects tend to play a two-trial
game in much the same way they play the
first two trials of a five-, ten-, or 300-trial
game.
It is also interesting to compare the one-
trial game with the first trial of other
games. As mentioned earlier, the only
basis for a subject’s first choice is a priori
reasoning. However, the number of trials
TABLE 5
MEAN COOPERATION ON THE FIRST TRIAL IN
GAMES WITH RUNS oF DIFFERENT LENGTHS
* See discussion of this result in the article by Rapo-
port and Dale in this issue.
he has in prospect may affect his choice on
the first trial. Very tentatively we might
conclude that the level of cooperation on
the first trial does vary with the length of
the run (see Table 5). This suggests again
that people perceive different lengths of
run in different ways.
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